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Introduction
Nunchi (눈치, pronounced noon-tchee),  a Korean 
word meaning literally “eye-measure,” is not wide-
ly considered a virtue, even in Korean contexts, but 
perhaps it should be. Nunchi is the ability both to 
accurately read others’ mental states by the subtlest 
of cues and to use this information to expertly steer 
social situations. The person who deftly directs con-
versation around sensitive topics has lots of nunchi, 
the person who constantly puts her foot in her mouth 
lacks it. In this paper, I introduce and discuss nunchi. I 
describe two broad senses of nunchi – nunchi as a skill 
and nunchi as a burden, and explain how each relates 
to well-being in both global and in specifically Kore-
an contexts. Finally, I argue that nunchi, at least in the 
skilled sense, should be treated as a virtue.
Skilled Nunchi
Nunchi is a very familiar concept in everyday Korean 
life and language and has been the focus of quite a bit 
of Korean scholarship in psychology, communication, 
and business, but it is probably not widely consid-
ered to be deeply philosophically interesting. “Nunchi” 
has a broad semantic range, and I cannot provide a 
complete analysis of the term and its usage here. In-
stead, I will highlight some of the ways in which the 
term is used that are relevant for this paper. Robinson 
(1996) provides a review of some English-language 
descriptions of nunchi: “tact, savoir faire, sense, social 
sense, perceptiveness, an eye for social situations … 
to read one’s mind, probe one’s motives, [study] one’s 
face, [grasp] a situation, [see] how the wind blows” 
(Martin, Lee, and Chang 1967), or a skill to deter-
mine “quickly and accurately…another’s emotions, 
attitudes, and reaction or likely reaction to a given 
proposal or situations” (Kalton 1979). Choi and Choi 
(1992) describe two key features of nunchi: first, that 
nunchi is especially oriented towards “covert, implic-
it, or indirect communicative exchanges, and second 
that nunchi interactions include both “figuring-out” 
indirect communication and successfully “executing” 
acts of indirect communication (Choi and Choi 1992, 
51). So, in the first major sense of nunchi that we’ll 
be examining, nunchi means something like an expert, 
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automatic skill in perceiving and deftly reacting to dy-
namic social and group situations, especially in ways 
that adroitly track (either intentional or unintention-
al) indirect communication. Let’s call this sense of the 
term “skilled nunchi.” Skilled nunchi comes in several 
levels. A person might “lack” nunchi: they frequently 
miss fairly obvious social cues or might frequently be 
rude without realizing it. Importantly, a person who 
is purposefully rude does not necessarily lack nunchi: 
unfortunately, some of the worst bullies might have 
a great deal of nunchi. Less worryingly (and much 
more commonly) a person might have “slow” nunchi: 
they are not completely socially oblivious or frequently 
unintentionally rude to others, but they might occa-
sionally fail to pick up on what in retrospect to them 
seem to be fairly clear social cues. A person who has 
“quick” nunchi, however, immediately picks up on even 
very subtle social cues and navigates them with ease. 
Interestingly, in Korean contexts, a person can be crit-
icized for having “too much nunchi,” which indicates 
that either the person is overly strategic or sycophan-
tic in social interactions, or alternatively that a person 
is overly deferential or submissive.
For our purposes, when I use the term “skilled nunchi” 
I will be referring to what we might consider “quick 
nunchi” or nunchi in the most positive sense, unless 
otherwise noted. In typical Korean usage, while these 
various attributions of nunchi can be used to indicate 
more general dispositions, they can also be used in 
discussing particular acts. For example, I might in 
general have nunchi, but in some specific instance 
commit a big social gaffe, and on that occasion, I 
lacked nunchi. In this way, nunchi corresponds nice-
ly in structure to Whole Trait Theory, a view in con-
temporary personality psychology (see Fleeson 2001; 
Fleeson and Jayawickreme 2015; Jayawickreme and 
Fleeson 2017). Whole trait theory posits personali-
ty traits and personality states, which have “the same 
content as a corresponding trait but…for a shorter 
duration” ( Jayawickreme and Fleeson 2017, 80). Flee-
son and Jayawickreme (2017) give a helpful example: 
“I could have the [personality] state of extraversion 
for the few minutes I ride the new roller coaster at 
the amusement park and return to my more common 
[personality trait of ] introversion after the ride” (81). 
Some examples of skilled nunchi and the lack there-
of might be helpful. Imagine two friends, Ann and 
Chul-soo, meeting each other for the first time in sev-
eral months. When they last spoke, Ann told Chul-
soo that she been expecting her romantic partner to 
propose marriage within the next few days. Thirty 
minutes into the conversation, Chul-soo suddenly 
asks Ann, without any avarice or ill-intent, whether 
she has is engaged yet. Chul-soo, in this situation dis-
played a lack of skilled nunchi. He should have known 
that Ann had some reason for not bringing up the 
previously expected engagement, and of the possible 
reasons why she chose not to, many would be em-
barrassing or even distressing to share. Alternatively, 
imagine two graduate students, Sera and Sam, who 
have recently started dating each other but wish to 
keep their relationship a secret from their colleagues. 
Sera, who is in the relationship, is talking to her friend 
and colleague Ahmed, and accidently lets slip infor-
mation that implies she is dating Sam. But, Ahmed 
responds as if he simply did not pick up on the im-
plication, though in fact he did (and if he has highly 
skilled nunchi, he likely knew of Sera’s relationship al-
ready). If Sera also has skilled nunchi, she realizes that 
Ahmed picked up on the salacious information, and 
in choosing not to address it, indirectly communicates 
to her that her secret is safe with him.
It will be useful here to distinguish between skilled 
nunchi and several similar and related, but ultimate-
ly distinct phenomena. First, one might be tempted 
to equate skilled nunchi with emotional intelligence, 
which has been defined as “the ability to perceive 
and express emotion, assimilate emotion in thought, 
understand and reason with emotion, and regulate 
emotion in the self and others” (Mayer, Salovey, and 
Caruso 2000, 396; see also Mayer and Salovey 1997; 
Mayer et al. 2011). Skilled nunchi allows us to detect a 
wider range of mental states than only emotions, so it 
differs from emotional intelligence. Further, a person 
with skilled nunchi might not be particularly skilled 
at understanding and reasoning with her own emo-
tions. Second, though skilled nunchi does not pertain 
only to indirect communication, its strong connota-
tions of skill in indirect communication distinguishes 
it from the more general notion of social intelligence. 
This difference is subtle, in part because a person with 
lots of nunchi will almost always have lots of social 
intelligence, and vice versa. Third, since skilled nunchi 
includes expert perceptive capacities, and because a 
person with skilled nunchi can (intentionally) act im-
politely should the situation require, skilled nunchi is 
not the same as tact, politeness, or civility – though 
again, they will often go hand-in-hand. Fourth, 
skilled nunchi is distinct from charisma, though they 
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too often coincide. Some people can be charismat-
ic despite lacking skilled nunchi – think here of an 
energetic, hilarious, but completely tactless comedian. 
And some people can have lots of nunchi without be-
ing particularly charismatic – especially if they are shy 
or introverted. Fifth, skilled nunchi is different from 
mind-reading, the skill helpfully glossed by Hagop 
Sarkissian as “what we engage in everyday – infer-
ring motives, meanings, and intentions from words, 
gestures, and expressions” (2010, 9). Skilled nunchi in-
cludes this mind-reading ability but is distinct from 
mind-reading in that nunchi relates not only to our 
perceptive abilities but also to our reactive behavior, 
and further it connotes a much greater emphasis on 
tracking indirect communication than the more gen-
eralized notion of mind-reading does. Finally, skilled 
nunchi is culturally distinct from all of these other no-
tions insofar as it, in addition to tracking mental states 
like beliefs, emotions, and desires, also tracks group 
dynamics and shared feelings as well as kibun (기분), 
pronounced key-boon). Kibun is another important 
Korean concept, which refers to a mental state relat-
ing to mood, atmosphere, climate, dignity, and face. In 
Korean contexts (especially in professional contexts), 
there is typically a strong emphasis on maintaining 
kibun and avoiding social friction and conflict. Do-
ing so well often requires nunchi, and any account of 
nunchi that does not refer to kibun is incomplete.
Philosophers with backgrounds in Western virtue 
ethics might be tempted to think that skilled nunchi 
is identical to or some form of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, which Aristotle defined as “a reasoned and 
true state of capacity to act with regard to human 
goods” (Nichomachean Ethics IV.5). A person with 
practical wisdom can perform morally excellent acts 
across a wide variety of particular situations in which 
one must weigh competing moral and prudential con-
cerns. But, this equation is incorrect. Skilled nunchi 
is, in fact, a much narrower concept than practical 
wisdom. A person with skilled nunchi might (and, in 
nearly all cases, does) lack (virtuous) practical wis-
dom, but a person with (virtuous) practical wisdom 
almost certainly has skilled nunchi. Skilled nunchi al-
lows one to be excellent at certain types of complex 
and dynamic social interactions, especially those that 
involve indirect communication and especially ones 
where tracking kibun is vital. But a person might have 
skilled nunchi and fail to be generous, or courageous, 
or humble, or kind. In fact, people with skilled nunchi 
can be morally vicious – they may use their skilled 
nunchi to manipulate others for their own selfish ends. 
Philosophers with backgrounds in Confucian ethics 
might wonder how skilled nunchi differs from quan 
權, “moral discretion” or “weighing.” In the Confu-
cian classic Mengzi, a character tries to trip up the 
eponymous Confucian philosopher Mengzi by posing 
what is meant to be an attack on the early Confu-
cian emphasis on adherence to ritual. He asks Meng-
zi whether one should save a drowning sister-in-law 
even though doing so would break a traditional ritu-
al rule that forbade direct physical contact between 
certain members of opposite genders (4A17). Mengzi 
replies, unsurprisingly, that “only a beast would not 
pull out his sister-in-law if she were drowning,” and 
that this is a matter of quan (Mengzi 4A17). Saving 
a drowning person might require quan but it simply 
does not require skilled nunchi. 
Burdened Nunchi
There is, however, another broad sense in which the 
term “nunchi” is used, and this sense is much less pos-
itive than that of skilled nunchi. Especially, nunchi in 
this other sense is often thought to place much great-
er burden on those with less power or status in social 
hierarchies (a graduate student must mind or “watch” 
her nunchi much more carefully than her senior pro-
fessors need to) and, relatedly, nunchi in this sense 
is thought of in traditional Korean contexts of put-
ting much more pressure on women than men, and 
on younger people than older people. In this nega-
tive sense, nunchi can mean something like skill in 
navigating extreme (and typically downward) social 
pressure. For example, in traditional Korean contexts, 
the maknae (막내 – pronounced “mang-nae”), or the 
youngest person (and often, though not at all neces-
sarily the youngest woman) in a group, might have 
special social expectations to navigate – for example, 
ensuring that coffee and tea is procured before an of-
fice meeting. I will call this more negative sense of the 
term “burdened nunchi.” 
Burdened nunchi shares many features with skilled 
nunchi. It requires skill in indirect communication, 
both in interpreting the mental states that others in-
tentionally and unintentionally communicate, and in 
directly and indirectly communicating with others. 
However, the purpose of burdened nunchi is often to 
smooth interactions with colleagues and superiors – 
even in situations when one would much rather not. 
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One must constantly act in ways that will not upset 
social harmony or the kibun, even when others (usu-
ally superiors) are treating one disrespectfully. Thus, 
burdened nunchi can be both exhausting and frus-
trating – one Korean school teacher told me that she 
wished she could escape from the nunchi of her job, 
and in that case, she was thinking of nunchi in the 
sense of burdened nunchi. Burdened nunchi, insofar as 
it restricts and constrains one’s ability to speak or act 
as they would like to can quite often be closely related 
to a sense of dabdabhae (답답해) – a feeling of being 
so frustrated or stifled by external circumstances in 
which one cannot act or speak as they want to that it 
feels as if one is physically suffocating.
Now, it must be pointed out that the distinction I’ve 
drawn here between skilled nunchi and burdened 
nunchi is artificial. Like most words with rich and 
complex meanings, native speakers tend not to care-
fully distinguish between the different senses of the 
term, and switch between them often and with ease. 
However artificial the distinction I’ve drawn here is, 
I do think it helps us understand some of the com-
plexity of the term “nunchi,” and it will be valuable 
for thinking about how nunchi is related to well-being 
and virtue. 
Nunchi and Flourishing
One major tradition in virtue ethics treats virtues as 
character traits or dispositions that are especially con-
ducive or even necessary for human flourishing. Do 
skilled nunchi and burdened nunchi contribute to hu-
man flourishing or well-being? In this section, I argue 
that they do.
The case for skilled nunchi is more straightforward. 
Skilled nunchi can contribute to well-being or flour-
ishing across a wide a variety of cultural contexts. 
Most directly, skilled nunchi, like social intelligence 
more generally benefits us in social situations. Con-
sider the following three cases, in which Nathan pos-
sesses skilled nunchi and Lucy lacks it:
Case 1: Nathan and Lucy are professors. When Na-
than’s students begin to lose track of the lesson, Na-
than immediately recognizes it. He sees their eyes 
glaze or squint, or start wandering around the room, 
their posture become more restricted, and generally 
notices their discomfort or their attention wandering. 
He is able to stop his lesson and re-engage the stu-
dents. Lucy, on the other hand, is oblivious that her 
students are beginning to feel confused, and keeps the 
lesson moving forward, which only serves to further 
confuse her students when they do try to pay atten-
tion.
Case 2: Nathan and Lucy are at a get-together with 
several friends. At one point, someone asks Minha, 
a mutual acquaintance who has recently married, the 
rather tactless question of how soon she will be hav-
ing a baby. Lucy thinks this is a fair question – she 
knows that Minha wanted to have children, so she 
waits expectantly for an answer. Nathan, however, no-
tices the slightest of frowns in Minha’s face, which 
she quickly hides. Using his skilled nunchi, Nathan 
infers that Minha’s discomfort extends past the typi-
cal negative reaction to an impolitely private question, 
and instantly decides that it is especially appropriate 
to change the subject to spare Minha. 
Case 3: Lucy and Nathan are fourth grade co-teach-
ers. Thirty minutes after a group craft math activity 
finishes, the children begin a new social studies lesson. 
One of the students, Tucker, who is usually well-be-
haved, starts to act out. Lucy notices and begins to 
chastise Tucker. Nathan, however, intervenes and 
takes Tucker aside. He noticed that Tucker had not 
been not happy with his assigned groupmates in the 
craft activity (he wished to be put in a group with 
his friends), and infers that this is the reason Tucker 
is acting out. Nathan tells Tucker this. Tucker didn’t 
realize it himself, but instantly realizes this was the 
cause of his acting out. 
In the Korean context, skilled nunchi is especially 
important because of the ubiquity of indirect com-
munication. In Korean culture, many types of direct 
communication can be interpreted as overly confron-
tational or disruptive of kibun. For example, if I wanted 
to go out to lunch with a colleague, instead of asking 
directly whether he wanted to go to lunch, I might in-
stead ask whether he had eaten yet or whether he felt 
hungry. My colleague should then use skilled nunchi 
to infer that I am looking for a lunch partner. Similar-
ly, if a teacher has just explained a new theory in her 
class, and asks her students whether they understand, 
they might all say “yes” enthusiastically because saying 
“no” might reflect poorly on the teacher’s explanation 
and thus disrupt kibun. 
So, stepping back, skilled nunchi contributes to 
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well-being or flourishing by helping us navigate so-
cial situations in which well-being (and thus flourish-
ing) are at stake. But, what about burdened nunchi? 
As we’ve seen, burdened nunchi feels exhausting, con-
stricting, and frustrating. Thus, it seems to be straight-
forwardly bad for well-being or flourishing. But, this 
inference is too hasty. Lisa Tessman (2005) has argued 
that there is a distinct and historically unappreciated 
set of “burdened” virtues “that, while practically ne-
cessitated for surviving oppression or morally neces-
sitated for opposing it, carry with them a cost to the 
bearer” (4). These are virtues that “have the unusual 
feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own 
flourishing” (Tessman 2005, 4). Burdened nunchi is, I 
think, a type of or closely related to a burdened virtue. 
And so, while it might be logically closed off from 
contributing to flourishing, in certain contexts bur-
dened nunchi might be necessary for well-being.
In the Korean context, obedience and deference to 
authority are traditionally emphasized virtues. Now, 
we must be careful here. This “culture of obedience” 
claim can be and has been easily exaggerated, and 
even problematically and erroneously weaponized in 
the form of “culture blaming” - for instance in cases of 
the tragic Sewol ferry disaster in 2014 and in several 
airline crashes (Ma 2014). Blaming nebulous aspects 
of a culture for highly specific, complex, multifaceted 
incidents is a morally fraught practice. The claim I am 
making here is different, and much more general – 
that deference towards authority is a historically im-
portant value in Korean culture and that this history 
still affects people today. It remains a common theme 
in Korean film, television, and literature, and perme-
ates how Koreans might often view their own culture. 
Consider the following case. A vice-principal at a 
middle school grows concerned that students are 
eating junk food and instead of throwing away the 
packaging, they litter by just throwing the empty junk 
food bags to the floor. Thus, he institutes a new rule 
that teachers must inspect students’ backpacks every 
morning and confiscate all junk food. The teachers are 
not enamored with this new policy. Most obviously, 
it means extra work for them. Further, they are not 
convinced that the problem is as dire as the vice-prin-
cipal seems to believe, and it seems that if littering is 
the issue, it would be more straightforward to just re-
quire students to be more proactive in picking up the 
trash. The teachers might also feel that it is morally 
inappropriate to have to root through their students’ 
backpacks. Yet, for many of these teachers, especial-
ly those who are young, voicing their discontent at 
the policy directly to the vice-principal is a non-start-
er. Doing so could be seen as disruptive. Even those 
who do feel comfortable criticizing the policy to the 
vice-principal quickly give up: the vice-principal is 
quite stubborn. In this situation, the teachers might 
use their burdened nunchi to express their discontent. 
They might use their body language, tone of voice, or 
facial expressions to show to their own students that 
they would prefer not to search their backpacks, or 
they might tell the vice-principal “your new policy 
must have worked: there is much less litter now. Due 
to the policy’s success, we probably do not need to 
enforce it as strictly anymore.”
Burdened nunchi has the general structure of a bur-
dened virtue. A person with greater social status would 
be able to more directly confront some issue head-on, 
instead of needing to carefully tip-toe around it us-
ing her burdened nunchi. Burdened nunchi becomes a 
survival skill for those without power or social status. 
There is little doubt that those whose social positions 
necessitate the use of burdened nunchi would be bet-
ter off if they did not need to utilize it. Further, bur-
dened nunchi can interfere with the development of 
non-burdened virtues. For example, it will be difficult 
to develop or acquire moral courage, and specifical-
ly the moral courage to confront those with greater 
social power or social status, if one is never put into 
situations in which acts of moral courage can succeed 
(e.g., if attempted acts of moral courage are viewed 
as simple disobedience and harshly punished without 
any positive outcome).
Skilled Nunchi and Virtue
Skilled nunchi can contribute to well-being or flour-
ishing in a meaningful way, but is it a virtue? This is 
not an easy question to answer. The most directly rel-
evant philosophical work here is likely Nancy Snow’s 
(2009) Virtue as Social Intelligence.  Therein, Snow ex-
plores a set of interesting claims concerning the rela-
tion of virtue and social intelligence: that some virtues 
are best characterized as forms of social intelligence, 
that some virtues require social intelligence to pro-
duce good results, and that having social intelligence 
will contribute to the virtuous person being able to 
use virtues not only to help others but to do so in 
ways that contribute to her own well-being (Snow 
2009). Of these three claims, only the first does not 
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also apply to skilled nunchi – I can think of no other 
virtue that should be characterized as a form of skilled 
nunchi. However, it is clear that skilled nunchi can 
contribute to the success of virtuous acts in much the 
same was as social intelligence does: in giving us ac-
cess to the mental states of others, it helps us to better 
commit kind or generous or caring acts, for example. 
Similarly, having skilled nunchi will help us to achieve 
our own life goals and to manage our own well-being 
in ways that least interfere with acting virtuously to-
wards others.
There are, however, reasons to think that skilled nunchi 
might not be a virtue. One might argue that, given its 
sometimes negative connotations, and given that it is 
closely related to a burdened virtue, that we should not 
treat it as a virtue. But, it is not clear that this argument 
succeeds. After all, many virtue terms have senses and 
usages in which they do not indicate positive moral 
value. For example, one can be criticized for being “too 
kind,” “too generous,” or “too humble,” even though 
kindness, generosity, and humility are virtues. But we 
can abstract away from these problematic associations 
to identify virtues of genuine moral value. Thus, the 
mere fact that some senses of the term “nunchi” fail 
to connote positive moral value does not mean that 
there is no sense of the term that represents a virtue. 
There is another argument nearby that is worth ad-
dressing here. One might claim that skilled nunchi is 
not a virtue because it is morally neutral – whether it 
produces good results or contributes to well-being or 
flourishing depends entirely on the presence of oth-
er virtues, such as kindness, compassion, and hones-
ty. There is something to this argument, and I must 
admit that I find it partially plausible. Yet, at least in 
this form, it might be too demanding. After all, most 
virtues, if they could be held by a person who had no 
other virtues, would not reliably produce impressive 
moral results. A person who is honest but lacks kind-
ness and tact is cruel, a person who is generous but 
lacks self-control, discretion, and street-smarts will 
give away money to unworthy causes, a person who is 
courageous but not morally wise will make bad moral 
decisions, courageously. Virtues support each other – 
and it seems that skilled nunchi supports other virtues 
and that other virtues support it.
Another concern might go something like this. 
Nunchi is deeply tied to acting with politeness, man-
ners, etiquette, and civility. But, there are important 
ethical challenges related to all of these (Stohr 2012; 
Calhoun 2000; Olberding 2015, 2016). Not only 
do some situations morally require that we behave 
uncivilly, emphasizing civility as a virtue might en-
courage people to behave civilly even when they are 
morally obligated not to. For example, we might find 
ourselves choosing not criticize a person for a slight-
ly offensive but clearly problematic comment made 
in casual conversation because doing so would feel 
impolite. One might claim that treating nunchi as 
a virtue exacerbates this problem, because behaving 
with nunchi might overvalue maintaining smooth so-
cial atmospheres or kibun compared to other impor-
tant moral considerations. That is, concern for skilled 
nunchi might encourage us to overvalue concern for 
social harmony, atmosphere, mood, and face. I think 
this is, in general, a very important worry. But, while 
acknowledging that there are certainly situations in 
which morality demands that we behave uncivilly, we 
should first be careful not overestimate the numbers 
and types of these situations. There are many situa-
tions in which remaining civil while still subtly com-
municating moral disapprobation may be a better op-
tion that dropping all pretenses of civility.  But, more 
importantly, when one realizes that she is morally ob-
ligated to behave uncivilly or rudely because of other 
important moral considerations, having skilled nunchi 
will allow one to do so in the most effective ways. 
Conclusion
In this essay, I have discussed two broad senses of 
nunchi. Skilled nunchi is an expert, automatic skill in 
perceiving and deftly reacting to dynamic social and 
group situations, especially in ways that adroitly track 
(either intentional or unintentional) indirect commu-
nication. Burdened nunchi is a skill in navigating ex-
treme (and typically downward) social pressure. I dis-
cussed the relation between skilled nunchi, burdened 
nunchi, and well-being or flourishing. Finally, I argued 
that there some strong reasons for considering skilled 
nunchi a moral virtue. 
Acknowledgments
This paper has benefitted from discussions with Amy 
Olberding, Nancy Snow, Sula You, and Sungwoo Um. 
Parts of this paper have been improved by helpful 
comments from Michael Puett and questions from 
the audience at the Harvard East Asia Society Grad-
uate Conference, as well as from questions from the 
audience and discussions at the International Society 
Science, Religion & Culture
2019 | Volume 6 | Special Issue 1 | Page 109                                                      
                              
for Chinese Philosophy Conference in Singapore. This 
publication was made possible through the support of 
a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to the 
Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing at The 
University of Oklahoma. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton 
Foundation, the Institute for the Study of Human 
Flourishing, or The University of Oklahoma.
References
• Brennan, Samantha. 2016. The Moral Status 
of Micro-Inequities - In Favor of Institutional 
Solutions. In Implicit Bias and Philosophy, edited 
by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul. Vol. 2. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Calhoun, Cheshire. 2000. The Virtue of Civility. 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (3): 251–75.
• Choi, Sang-Chin, and Soo-Hyang Choi. 1992. 
The Conceptualization of Korean Tact, Noon-Chi. In 
Innovations in Cross-Cultural Psychology, edited by 
Saburo Iwawaki, Yoshihisa Kashima, and Kwow 
Leung, 49–61. Berwyn, PA: Swets & Zeitlinger.
• Fleeson, William. 2001. Toward a Structure- and 
Process-Integrated View of Personality: Traits as 
Density Distributions of States. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 80 (6): 1011–27.
• Fleeson, William, and Eranda Jayawickreme. 
2015. Whole Trait Theory. Journal of Research in 
Personality 56: 82–92.
• Jayawickreme, Eranda, and William Fleeson. 
2017. Does Whole Trait Theory Work for the 
Virtues? In Moral Psychology, Volume 5: Virtue 
and Character, edited by Walter Sinnott-Arm-
strong and Christian Miller, 75–104. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
• Kalton, Michael. 1979. Korean Ideas and Values. 
The Philip Jaisohn Memorial Papers 7. Elkins 
Park.
• Ma, Kai. 2014. South Korean Ferry Sinking 
Leads to Culture Blaming and Stereotyping. 
Time. http://time.com/75742/south-korea-fer-
ry-asian-stereotypes-culture-blaming/.
• Martin, Samuel E., Yang Ha Lee, and Sung-un 
Chang. 1967. A Korean-English Dictionary. Yale 
Linguistic Series. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
• Mayer, John D., and Peter Salovey. 1997. What Is 
Emotional Intelligence? In Emotional Development 
and Emotional Intelligence: Implications for Educa-
tors, edited by Peter Salovey and David Sluyter, 
3–31. New York: Basic Books.
• Mayer, John D., Peter Salovey, and David Caru-
so. 2000. Models of Emotional Intelligence. In 
Handbook of Intelligence, edited by Robert J. Stern-
berg. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Mayer, John D., Peter Salovey, David R. Caruso, 
and Lillia Cherkasskiy. 2011. Emotional Intelli-
gence. In The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence, 
edited by Robert J. Sternberg and Scott Barry 
Kaufman. Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Olberding, Amy. 2015. From Corpses to Courte-
sy: Xunzi and the Defense of Etiquette. Journal of 
Value Inquiry 49: 145–59.
• ———. 2016. Etiquette: A Confucian Contribu-
tion to Moral Philosophy. Ethics 126 (2): 422–46.
• Robinson, James. 1996. Professional Commu-
nication in Korea: Playing Things by Eye. IEEE 
Transactions on Professional Communication 39 (3): 
129–34.
• Sarkissian, Hagop. 2010. Confucius and the Ef-
fortless Life of Virtue. History of Philosophy Quar-
terly 27 (1): 1–16.
• Snow, Nancy. 2009. Virtue as Social Intelligence: An 
Empirically Grounded Theory. Routledge.
• Stohr, Karen. 2012. On Manners. Routledge.
• Tessman, Lisa. 2005. Burdened Virtues: Virtue Eth-
ics for Liberatory Struggles. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
• Van Norden, Bryan W., trans. 2008. Mengzi - With 
Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Hackett.
Endnotes
[1] For example, Samantha Brennan has discussed the 
potential moral value of “micro-sanctions” (see Bren-
nan 2016).
